

ACTIONS TAKEN REGARDING THE CUBAN CRESS

BUMMARY

- 1. This is a chrounded presentation of AFIC actions, taken or planned, organized or effered to connection with the Cuban crisis.
- 2. In accordance with the guidance furnished by AFCIN-Y, the AFCIN Project Office, all such plantificant actions since 29 August 1963 (the date of discovery of the first SAM site in Cuba) through November 1963 are presented. In a few instances actions prior to this period are also presented because they are considered to bear on the problem.
 - The types of actions undertaken generally fell into four categories:
 - a. Providing personnel to organizations external to AFIC.
 - b. Providing intelligence information and targeting support on a quick response basis to spot
 - c. Maintaining liaison with organizations external to AFIC.
 - d. Performing the regular targeting and estimating functions.

One element was paramount in all of these actions -- timeliness. The requirement for speedy response on a round-the-clock basis was met primarily by putting certain analysts and photo interpreters on an on-call basis to organizations enternal to AFIC who required this support and by maintaining an intelligence room in an all-source area which was manned at all times and which was the AFIC duty office after normal working hours.

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BY: ACS/LHQ USAF



4. Main problem areas stemmed from unusually stringent security procedures that went into effect upon receipt of photography confirming the existence of MRBM/IRBM sites in Cuba, from the general non-availability of photography during the crisis period, and from the lag in receipt of collateral information. The effect of these three factors was to limit severely the timely application of AFIC analytical resources to the new intelligence information being received. Although AFIC had realigned its functions and responsibilities on Cuba so as to achieve the type and emphasis of treatment normally accorded the Sino-Soviet Bloc, there was a dearth of high quality photography available to AFIC. Accordingly, targeting of MRBM/IRBM sites and nuclear weapons storage cites was not carried out ar quickly or effectively as it should have been, evaluations of TAC target lists were hampered, and targeting of other less high priority facilities only now is getting under way.


Be Events to date reveal the following major requirements:

An established procedure for the most rapid possible receipt in AFIC of reconneissance the design of the collecting agency or service.

b. An understanding that responsibility for targeting constitutes a "must know, "

c. Improvement in the amount of time necessary to handle and dispatch colleteral material.

de Standing Operating Procedure for AFCIN in emergency situations where the AJCC has not been activated, is., DEFCON-3 and below.



ACTION

: Information Regarding the Fearibility of

Moving Hissiles to Cuba

ACTION OFFICER

APCIN-JAI

DATE INITIATED: 23 October 1962

FINAL POHE/DISTRIBUTION:

KY telephone cell to AFCD -28

REQUIREMENT

Information concerning the feasibility of moving missiles to Oubs by air or sea transport.

REQUESTING

AUTHORITY

AFCIN-2B, for Major General, Deputy Director of Plans for : Colonel Colon Aerospace Vians.

REACTION TIME: 23 October 1962 with a follow-up at 0900 24 October 1962.

STROLLRY

s Colonel with wished to know the feasibility of transporting missiles from the USER to Cubs by using the TU-114/CLEAT, the II-18/0007, the AN-8/CMP, and the AN-12/CUB transports, or by using the present classes of Soviet submarines. It was determined that the 83-4 and 85-5 missiles could not be broken down into small enough packages to be carried by the CLEAT or the COOT without major structural modifications. It was further determined that neither the CMP nor the CVB has the necessary range to make the flight without touching down in, or flying over, US. territory. Through information gathered from APCIN-3F, it was determined that no Soviet subscrime had the capability of transporting either the 85-4 or the 83-5 either assembled or disassembled. This information was reported to Colonel Farrier on 23 Oatober. On the morning of the 24th, Colone wished to know if the SS-4 or the SS-5 could be transported in any manner by surface weesel without detection. It was determined that this was not feasible at the present time if the detection crows were sufficiently trained.

PETURKS

. it was estimated that the structural modifications to enable the CLEAT or the COOT to make this flight would take approximately two months while the installation of a suitable deck capsule on Soviet submarines would require not less than 6 months.

> DECLASSI FIED ONI BY: ACS/I: HQ USAE



ACTION: Evaluation of CINCAFCANT OPLAN 312

ACTION OFFICER: Major AFCIN-3K3

DATE INITIATED: 22 October 1962

FINAL FORM/DISTRIBUTION: Letter with Attachments

to JCS (J-2)

REQUIREMENT:

To assess the residual Cuban military capability after implementation of

CINCAFCANT OPLAN 312.

REGUESTING AUTHOR:

Telephone call from Colonella 1.2 JC8 (J-2) to AFCIH-3P; and a J-2

chaired meeting attended by DIA, ONI, ACSI-Army and AFCIN-3.

REACTION TIME:

The final terms of reference were established by 1700, 22 October 1962. The

product was delivered by 1500 23 October 1962.

SUMMARY:

The single deficiency in the plan was the omission of certain targets which resulted from subsequent photo reconnaissance missions. Despite these omissions continuing AFIC-TAC liaison had corrected the discrepancy. The

residual Guban military capability was assessed as ineffective.

REMARKS:

No problems encountered.

DECLASSI FIED ON



ADSION: Report of Construction Activity within Close Frontisty
of Ousstance Bay Cube Neval Air Facility

21 Horanber 1962

ACTION OFFICER: No. WARRANTE

FINAL FORM/BIETAIBUTION: Formal Report band carried to AFRIF-3

REQUIREMENT: Profile LTGIS with synthesized evaluation report of any type construction correctly taking place within close premisity to the Maral Base perimeter.

ANADISM THE: 5 hours

Applicates has a result of everehing coveral hundred refugee reports it was determined that large expectations have taken place since 1961 close to the Suce parimeter and that apparently some construction is presently in progress because one report, dated July 1962, states that during the past year work has been progressing on a tunnel from the vicinity of Al Gricte and in the direction of the Pasc.



ACTION: APCIN-312

DATE ANTELOGICAL A Bovenber 1962

ACTION CAVICER: LA Colonel WE

PARTITION Installation of shelving for storage of rell film.

MEDICATION ACTIONITY: AFCIN-31 (Chairman, 179).

MAGETON TOBE & Working days.

SECOND'S Tastellation completed by Arlington Hall Station Fost Engineers on 5 Hovember 1968.

MEMBER: Approximately 3500 Linear foot of temporary wooden enciving installed in Room 1601, "B"
Building Arlington Hall Station (AFCIN-3E2a, May and Chart Library) to meet anticipated
input of MIJE MOON and BRASS NEWS roll film.

(MEPARATINE INSTRUCTIONS: Four copies desired; single space - double space between paragraphs).



ACTION: (3) Earmarking of Caban Defensive Missile System Signal

ACTION OFFICER: TD.C

DATE MITIATED:

FINAL FORM/DISTRIBUTION: Teletype to SAC

REQUIREMENT: Determine if early Cuban SAM ELINT signals were of the late-model "C" band type.

REQUESTING AUTHORITY: SAC He ELINT Analysis Group

REACTION TIME: Teletype reply on 9 November 1962.

SUMMARY: FTD evaluation of intercepts established the general late-model nature of Soviet SAM site desloyment in Cuba.

REMARKS: Special, expedited treatment is being given to all requests from operational commands, particularly in relation to the Cuban situation, for FTD technical ELINT analysis.